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The economic theory of Wiener Kreis and Mathematische Kolloquium. The complex role 
of Karl Menger  
Summary This paper deals with the relation between economics and mathematics in the 
Wiener Kreis and the Mathematische Kolloquium. Its aims are to show the role of economics 
as a science in Austrian neopositivism (in particular in Otto Neurath’s contributions); to 
underline how economic theory became a part of Unified Science (the thesis of the Wiener 
Kreis Manifesto, 1929); to describe the methodological and epistemological cleavage that 
arose in Karl Menger’s Mathematische Kolloquium; to stress the fact that the reformulation 
of the model of general economic equilibrium (GEE) in Kolloquium distanced economic 
theory greatly from the Kreis’s neopositivist point of view; and to point out some opinions on 
the relation between the Kreis and the Kolloquium that the past literature has not clarified 
completely. The role of Karl Menger is fundamental to understanding of these historical 
developments,which brought about very close adherence between Austrian economic theory 
and mathematical economics. But I shall try to show that this interpretation is very 
problematic. 
JEL classification: B25; B31; B40 
 
Introduction 
As Weintraub (2002) said, when we talk about the interconnections between economics and 
mathematics, we must first clarify to which kind of mathematics we are referring, without 
confusing the several kinds of mathematical language and their varying degrees of 
abstraction and formalization. When dealing with the controversial relation between 
economics and mathematics, we are accustomed to studying the subject from the  point of 
view of economists, seeking to understand what mathematical instruments they employ, and 
to determine whether they make proper use of them. It is also possible to approach the matter 
by taking the opposite point of view: that is, by investigating how mathematicians (and 
scientists in general) consider economics and in particular mathematical economics. In this 
paper I shall seek to show how the Viennese physicists and mathematicians of the Wiener   2
Kreis  and the Mathematische Kolloquium considered economic theory, and the kind of 
mathematical economics that they developed.  
I shall try to answer to the following questions. What kind of interest did economics arouse, 
first in the Kreis and then in the Kolloquium? What members of these groups were engaged 
in economics and what kinds of economic problems did they deal with? Did they regard 
economics as a science and, if they did, what epistemological and methodological model did 
they apply to it. Was this model the same in the Kreis and in the Kolloquium? What was the 
role of Karl Menger, the mathematician son of Carl Menger, who first joined the Kreis and 
then left it to found the Kolloquium? Finally, can we agree with Menger’s judgement on the 
relation between mathematical economics and the Austrian school? 
On answering these questions, we shall see the methodological and epistemological break 
between Karl Menger’s Kolloquium and the universalistic and encyclopaedic project pursued 
by the Wiener Kreis during the 1930s. On the contrary, the past literature – Menger (1973; 
1980; 1994), Gilles (1981), Weintraub (1983), Punzo (1991) – has argued for some sort of 
continuity between the Kreis, the Kolloquium, and even the economic theory of Austrian 
school. As Gilles (1981) wrote: “What then is Karl Menger’s unified philosophical outlook? 
Not surprisingly for a member of the Vienna Circle, it is logical positivism, and this label 
actually fits Menger better than it does some other members of the Circle”. Gilles continues: 
“many important ideas of the Vienna Circle originates with Menger – though they are often 
attributed to others”. As Punzo (1991) puts it: “[The] interest [in mathematical foundational 
issues] was enhanced by strong, often personal, bonds with the members of the Wiener Kries, 
and economists often participated in both clubs”. 
Menger stressed the close relation between the Kreis’s members and the mathematicians of 
the Kolloquium, recalling that: “on several occasions, the mathematicians in the Circle helped 
the philosophers by providing them with technical information – often concerning their own 
results. I remember, for instance, a discussion about inductive processes in physics” (Menger 
1980, p. 13).  And furthermore: “in these meetings, topics and results in their and my fields 
of interest were reported and discussed. We followed the unconstrained style of the Schlick 
Circle”  (Menger 1994, p. 201). 
Most recently, Stadler (2001) and Becchio – Marchionatti (2005) have recognized the 
controversial role of Karl Menger in the passage from the Kreis to the Kolloquium: “Menger 
further distanced himself from the Vienna Circle in the course of the latter’s protocol 
sentence debate between two opposing positions: Schlick’s “foundation of knowledge” (in 
the form of affirmations”) and Carnap’s and Neurath’s fallible conception of the empirical   3
basis of science in the form of the physicalist protocol sentences. Advocating a moderate 
position, Menger finally expressed his criticism of unified science in a remarkable overall 
assessment” (Stadler 2001, p. 400). 
 
1. History of Kreis and  Kolloquium (1922 – 1939)  
The Wiener Kreis was founded in 1922 as a philosophical circle by the physicist Moritz 
Schlick, who organized meetings every Thursday evening to discuss philosophy and the 
natural and social sciences, to which the members endeavoured to apply the neoempiricist 
paradigm. The epistemological model of this new empiricism was set out in Schlick’s Theory 
of Knowledge (1918), in which he distinguished between kennen (mere intuitions in the 
stream of sensations) and erkennen (concepts linked to symbols in order to produce scientific 
knowledge). These concepts must always be verified: not, however, by correlating them with 
mere perceptive data, but by finding a tool able to remove heterogeneity between empirical 
observation and logical elaboration. Scientists working in numerous disciplines joined the 
Kreis. Hans Hahn and Kurt Reidmeister were mathematicians: the former arrived in Vienna 
from Prague in 1923, in order to take up the chair of philosophy of science (previously 
occupied by Mach and Bolzmann). Otto Neurath was interested in mathematics, economics 
and sociology. Victor Kraft was a historian and Felix Kaufmann a lawyer. In 1926 the 
philosopher Rudolph Carnap joined the group and introduced it to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein’s  statement that “everything that can be said, can be said clearly” (T 4.116) 
became the Kreis’s intellectual directive: it expressed not only an a-metaphysical but also an 
anti-metaphysical point of view.  
In 1927 Karl Menger returned to Vienna (where he had been born and where he had studied 
physics and mathematics) on invitation by Hans Hahn, his old friend and mentor, (Menger 
1994). From 1924 to 1927 he had worked in Amsterdam as Brouwer’s assistant. 
Disappointed by Brouwer’s intuitionism, he came back to Vienna, where he was appointed 
professor of geometry and took over the chair previously occupied by Kurt Reidmeister (who 
had moved to Prague). He joined the Kreis on invitation by Schlick and Carnap, who were 
very interested in his studies of curve theory. In 1928 Menger organized his Mathematische 
Kolloquium, in collaboration with the Warsaw School: these were informal meetings held in 
the evenings with some of his students and colleagues, among them Kurt Gödel and 
Abraham Wald. Many foreign visitors attended Menger’s seminars as well, for instance John 
von Neumann. During a seminar on “Vienna in the 1930s” held on 9 April 1975 with F. 
Machlup, at NYU, Oskar Morgenstern recalled some of them: Knight, Ohlin, Kaldor,   4
Robbins, Marget, Perroux, Viner, Balogh, Schneider, Lange, Zeuthen, Robertson, Anderson, 
Nurske, Robinson, Alan and Paul Sweezy, Graham.
1 In 1931 Menger became the editor of 
Ergebniss eines Mathematische Kolloquium (I series, Vienna, 1931-37),
2 in which papers 
given at the Kolloquium’s meetings were published. 
In the meantime, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (1929) was printed 
and signed by Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath and Rudoph Carnap. This was regarded as the 
Kreis’s  manifesto. According to Philip Frank, the expression “wissenschaftlichen 
Weltauffassung” (i.e. a particular scientific conception of the world) was used instead of 
“Weltanschaung”, a term with excessively metaphysical connotations. The Manifesto was 
dedicated to Moritz Schlick, and it was published on the occasion of the Prague conference 
on “the Gnoseology of Exact Sciences”. The Manifesto stated the intention of the Viennese 
scientists to extend the Kreis’s project to the entire scientific community, and then to society 
as a whole, the purpose being to free scientific and common knowledge from metaphysics, 
and to replace old materialism with modern empiricism. This desire for openness became 
evident in the so-called ‘internationalization’ of the Kreis during the 1930s, when its 
activities focused on the organization of international congresses (Prague 1929; Könisberg 
1930; Prague 1934; Paris 1935; Copenhagen 1936; Paris 1937; Cambridge, Mass 1938; 
Harvard 1939) in order to promote its project for an International Encyclopaedia of Unified 
Science, which was finally presented at the “First Congress for the Unity of Science” held in 
Paris (1935). The first volume of the Encyclopaedia was published in 1938, and it was, 
according to Neurath, the natural development of the Manifesto’s program. This 
universalistic approach able to unify all the empirical sciences from a methodological point 
of view by the use of rigorous language (so-called physicalism), was pursued by the Kreis 
during the period of its international acme (Stadler 2001).  
In the meantime, many member of Kreis had left Austria after Dolfuss’s assassination; as 
Menger wrote: “in 1934 Schlick, Waismann (at that time both completely under 
Wittgenstein’s spell) and Kraft were the only members of the original Circle left in Vienna” 
(Menger 1974, p. 114). Nazi domination definitively destroyed freedom in Austria and all the 
Viennese intellectual movements. Menger described the period in Vienna from 1927 up to 
1938 in his Reminiscences, published posthumously in 1994. Their drafts are conserved in 
the archive of Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham (North Carolina, U.S.). On reading 
these drafts one finds that many parts of the original text are still unpublished. The reason for 
                                                           
1 See Oskar Morgenstern’s Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, box 63.  
2 Menger held his Kolloquium also at Notre Dame where he was also the editor of  Reports of a 
Mathematical Colloquium (II, 1937-46).  Between 1946 and 1971 he taught at the Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Chicago.    5
the book’s incompleteness is Menger’s precarious health while he was working on it
3. These 
unpublished chapters are of great interest because they describe the evolution of the rupture 
between the Kreis and the Kolloquium, i.e. between physicians and social scientists (Schlick, 
Neurath, Carnap, Waismann), on the one hand, and mathematicians (Menger, Wald, von 
Neumann, Gödel) on the other. This discontinuity between these two philosophical 
movements? has often been overlooked, or even denied. 
 
2.  Economics in the Wiener Kreis: from Manifesto (1929) to Encyclopaedia of Unified 
Sciences (1938) 
Otto Neurath introduced economics into the Wiener Kreis (Neurath 1973; 1983; 2004 and 
Uebel 1991). He had studied philosophy and economics at Vienna (as an undergraduate) and 
Berlin (as a Ph.D. student). Karl Menger described him as “a man of an immense energy and 
curiosity” (Menger 1994, p. 60). He began his career with some short essays on Boolean 
algebra and then became closely interested in economics and sociology. According to the 
bibliography of the Manifesto, Neurath was the only member of the Kreis concerned with the 
foundations of sociology and economics. 
Neurath described himself as a ‘social engineer’ and sought to find a technical approach to 
economics that would transform economic systems; he studied economic theory in order to 
change the social order according to a rational model for the improvement of the lower 
classes. In Vienna he had attended Böhm-Bawerk’s seminars, studying the Mengerian 
version of marginalism, and criticizing it. In Neurath’s view, the metaphysical concept of 
marginal utility, which was perfectly suited to the “bourgeois theory of Menger father” 
(Leonard, 1998), was useless not only in understanding but above all in modifying the 
material conditions of the working classes.  
Neurath’s first essays in economics were written at the beginning of the century and 
consisted of methodological inquiries into ancient and modern economic history. He declared 
himself closely influenced by Pareto’s Manuel,
4 with which he shared the opinion that, after 
introduction of homo oeconomicus, economic theory had become too abstract: “homo 
economicus was created, as Pareto remarked (1909) endowed  also with an economic motive 
that until then had been alien to psychology and will probably remain so in the future” 
                                                           
3 Karl Menger’s archive contains numerous letters in which he asks old Viennese friends to help him 
reconstruct the history of the Viennese period. See in particular the letter from Karl Popper (21 March 
1971) and Herbert Feigl (3 May 1972), Karl Menger Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, box 22 
(Vienna Circle Materials). 
4 V. Pareto Manuel d’economie politique, Paris, 1909; see also V. Pareto “Anwendungen der Mathematik auf 
Nationalökonomie”, in Enzyklopädie der Mathematische Wissenschaften, I, 2, Teubner, Leipzig, 1910?.   6
(Neurath 2004, p. 274). Abstractness was the first defect of economics; the other was its 
“fallacy”, which derived from the identification of economics as a whole with just one 
historical model of it (the monetary economy): “economic theory also followed too closely 
the example of monetary economics” (p. 278). This mistake caused the transformation of 
political economy to monetary economy. Neurath wrote: “the thought was lost sight of that 
money itself is but a means of the technique of organization that might be radically changed 
or even removed” (ibid.). According to Neurath, these two errors were rooted in “the 
opposition between abstract economic theory and concrete economics from the history of 
economic thought” that provoked the famous debate on Methodenstreit. 
Neurath was convinced that the aim of economic theory is to explain how the material 
conditions of life are formed by “transfers of goods” and to identify the conditions under 
which one state can be derived from the other. He claimed: “true science consists in 
systematically examining all possible cases. Exact political economy has not achieved this 
until now. It does not even encompass all actual cases. This is one of the reason why exact 
theory finds itself in opposition to the historical school and why it does not have an awful lot 
to say to those economists who occupy themselves with issues of practical interest, theories 
of crises, cartels and trusts” (ibid.).  
In 1917 he wrote The Conceptual Structure of Economic Theory and its Foundations 
(Neurath 2004). This marked Neurath’s passage from an exclusive methodological interest to 
investigations into concrete alternatives to liberal society. He maintained that it was 
necessary “to create a structure for an economic theory that is able in principle to provide 
equal theoretical treatment to all possible forms of economic activity.” (ibid p. 312). Neurath 
now formulated his theory of the so-called “economy-in-kind,” as an alternative to both the 
capitalist and socialist economies. An economy-in-kind derived, not from the concept of 
economic efficiency but from that of “wealth”, i.e. “what one produces and consumes in the 
widest sense”. This concept “is linked to all those scholars who simultaneously treat different 
forms of economy and to all those who as utopians treat of possible institutions” Neurath 
remarked that only a small number of economists were able to do this, most notably Carl 
Menger and Vilfredo Pareto.  
During the First World War, Neurath joined the debate on planned economy  (Uebel 1991; 
Caldwell 1997, Neurath 2004). In 1919 he argued that during times of peace, profit-oriented? 
economic production provoked cyclical periods of overproduction and unemployment. In 
wartime, on the contrary, production which was not directed to profit was always fully 
utilized, and suppression of the price system (replaced by planned prices) gave greater   7
stability. Neurath recommended that some sort of planned economy should continue during 
peacetime, because it assured a better allocation of means. He insisted that there was no need 
for economic computation, because production can be objectively determined by general 
needs, rather than by profit-seeking, and he maintained that any computation of inputs and 
outputs could be conducted in physical terms.
5  
Neurath soon became one of the most influential member of the Kreis: in 1929, together with 
Carnap and Hahn, he signed the Manifesto, which placed economics  among the five sciences 
that were to become objects of the new positivist philosophy. The Manifesto regarded Carl 
Menger  (like Quesnay, Smith, Ricardo, Comte, Marx, Walras, Müller-Lyer) as a forerunner 
of those scientists able to use empirical and anti-metaphysical methodology in social 
sciences. The task of such a method was to clarify the paradigms of disciplines still 
excessively  metaphysical. For example, it was necessary to purge history and economics of 
concepts like “spirit of the people” (Volkgeist), as had been done in physics, when the 
concept of “causality” had been replaced by “relation”.  
During the 1930s Neurath worked on the ideal of a unified science, Einheitswissenshaft, and 
on “physicalism”, its new scientific language. In Physicalism (1931), he explained how the 
ideal of an unified science could be achieved by transferring the language of physics to the 
other sciences according to neoempiricist approach. He wrote: “At first the Vienna Circle 
analysed ‘physics’ in a narrower sense almost exclusively; now psychology, biology, 
sociology. The task of this movement is unified science and nothing less” (Neurath 1983, p. 
52). The hierarchy of known objects now comprised concepts of the mind’s experiences and 
qualities; physical objects; objects of the social sciences. All of these were included in the so-
called unified science because they had constant and quantitative relations to which 
physicalism was applicable. Neurath also introduced sociology into this ideal of unified 
science, considering it to be the merging of history and political economy. 
The project to unify sciences was actualized in the Encyclopaedia of Unified Sciences, which 
was presented at international congresses for the unity of science organized between 1934 
and 1939 by members of the Kreis (Neurath and Carnap in particular) jointly with the Berlin 
group, the Warsaw school and American pragmatists, principally Charles Morris (Stadler, 
2001). Only one of the papers given at these congresses dealt with economics. It was Robert 
Gibrat’s  La Science economique. Methodes et philosophie (Gibrat, 1936), which treated 
economics as a complex science that must be expressed in mathematical terms. According to 
Gibrat the proper mathematical tools for economics were econometric ones able to analyze 
                                                           
5 Neurath’s paper on economic computation provoked L. von Mises’s reaction (von Mises 1920; von Hayek 
1935).   8
statistical data.
6 The sixth volume of the International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, 
devoted to economics, was written by Gerhard Tintner and came out in 1968. It was the 
natural development of Gibrat’s point of view: economic theory must use mathematics, and 
econometric models in particular. Tintner wrote: “As Carnap (1938) has pointed out, the 
procedure of social and hence economics are fundamentally the same as in the natural 
science (see also Morris 1938, 1946). Prices and quantities sold, interest rates, and the like 
are all quantitative concepts. … For investigations of a whole economy, it is frequently 
necessary to construct index numbers – for example, a cost-of-living index, various price 
indexes which represent prices in sectors of the total economy …” (Tintner 1968, p. 11). 
 
3. From Kreis to Kolloquium: Karl Menger on language and  mathematics  
Karl Menger joined the Kreis in 1927 on his return to Vienna from Amsterdam, but at the 
end of 1928 he “became aware of, and ever more disturbed by, [its] imprecision in the 
epistemological ideas and formulations” (Menger 1982, p. 90). The publication of the 
Manifesto, which he called  “rather superficial” (Menger 1974, p. 114), alienated him from 
the Kreis: “the pamphlet estranged me from the Circle to the point where I asked Neurath to 
list me henceforth merely as close to, rather than as a member of, the Circle” (Menger 1982, 
p. 92). The distance between Menger and the Kreis became evident in regard to the role of 
mathematics and language in the new Weltauffassung, (Menger 1974; 1982; 1994). These 
different points of view are fundamental for understanding the rupture between the Kreis and 
the Kolloquium in economic theory as well. 
To comprehend the Kreis’s point of view on mathematics we must consider Hahn’s thoughts 
on the matter  (Hahn 1980). In 1930 he wrote: “observation and the tautological 
transformations of thought – these are the only means of knowledge we recognize” (Hahn, 
1980, p. 21)He claimed that the mathematics of the Kreis constituted an alternative  to both 
Hilbert’s formalism and Brouwer’s intuitionism. Hahn considered Russell’s logicism to be 
the only valid epistemological model: “our adoption of Russell’s position may cause some 
surprise in Germany where all ears are turned to the controversy between intuitionism and 
formalism – between Brouwer and Hilbert… [Brouwer’s] point of departure seems too much 
akin to Kant’s pure intuitionism and Kant’s a priori. … As regards Hilbert’s formalism, what 
must be pointed out from our point of view is above all the unexplained role of 
metamathematical considerations” (p. 26). This meta-mathematical knowledge derived 
                                                           
6 In January 1933 the first number of «Econometrica» was printed. It was the official review of the 
Econometric Society, founded in 1930, by Irving Fisher and Ragnar Frisch. According to its statute, the aim 
of this society was to promote the use of quantitative approach in analyzing economic problems. (See also  
Mirowski 1989).   9
neither from experience nor from logical transformations, and hence its nature was not 
explained. It was for this reason that Hahn adopted a “skeptical position towards Hilbert’s 
point of departure” (p. 26). 
In a subsequent paper of 1931, (Hahn 1980) Hahn again took up this position against the 
intuitionism of A. Heyting and the formalism of J. von Neumann: “I regard the investigations 
of both Brouwer and Hilbert as highly significant within mathematics, but I do not regard 
them as theories of the foundations of mathematics” (p. 32). Hahn again recalled Russell’s 
approach but rejected his absolute realism: “I now assume, like Russell, that for describing 
the world (or better a selection of world) we have at our disposal a system of predicative 
functions, etc. – though, unlike Russell, I do not believe that the predicative functions are 
something absolutely given, something we can point out in the world” (p. 35). 
Hahn’s position on mathematics is crucial for understanding the discussion on mathematics 
by the Kreis, but it was not the “one and only” position that it took up on this matter. For 
example, Rudolph Carnap did not fully share it. In 1931 he wrote to von Neumann: “My own 
conception is not that of Russell but rather rests on a combination of Russell’s and Hilbert’s 
ideas: therefore it will also be affected quite strongly by Gödel’s results” (Mancosu, 1998, p. 
41)
7.  
The debate on the foundation of mathematics was complex, in fact, above all after the 
Könisberger congress (September 1930), during which Gödel announced his revolutionary 
results. We can deduce from some letters between Carnap and von Neumann that Carnap was 
extremely interested in Gödel’s theorems: he “surely had difficulties with the technical 
details of the proof [but] the importance of Gödel’s result was immediately clear to him” 
(Mancosu, 1998, p. 39). Von Neumann was also deeply influenced by Gödel, whose 
announcement of the incompleteness proof was “one of the major turning points of [his] 
intellectual life … [and] it stole away at least half of von Neumann’s mathematical raison 
d’être” (Mirowski, 1992, p.122). Menger was struck by Gödel’s theorem as well. Herbert 
Simon (Simon, 1991) recalled in his autobiography that Menger had once told him that he 
began his career deeply interested in logics and in the fundaments of mathematics, but after 
the publication of Gödel’s theorem he had believed it impossible to give a rigorous 
foundation to mathematics. He himself  wondered what was meant by mathematical certainty 
and never found the answer.  
                                                           
7 The correspondence between Carnap and von Neumann on this matter shows that also the Hungarian mathematicians 
were deeply impressed by  Gödel’s results. In June 1931 von Neumann wrote to Carnap: “Thus I am today of the 
opinion that Gödel has shown the unrealizability of Hilbert’s program; there is no more reason to reject intuitionism (if 
one disregards the aesthetic issue, which in practice will also for me be the decisive factor)” (Mancosu. 1998, p. 40).   10
As said, the distance between Menger and the Kreis concerned mathematics and language. 
Menger did not share the Kreis members’ view of mathematics as a set of tautologies that can 
be reduced to a logical-formal pattern entirely independent from actual reality. He rejected 
the idea of a single logic with rules on which mathematics is formed and suggested a variety 
of logics. He wrote: “So I finally arrived at the conclusion that the member of the Circle must 
be thinking of the reduction of mathematics to logic claimed in the Principia Mathematica in 
1910 … [but] I failed to see what the ill-defined use of the term ‘tautology’ in the 
provocative reference to mathematics as a system of tautologies substantially added to 
Russell’s claim that mathematics can be reduced to logic”. (Menger 1994, p. 141). Hence 
Menger in a certain sense endorsed Hilbert’s endeavour to construct a sort of meta-
mathematics. He wrote: “a mathematical theory, I emphasized, consists of nothing but 
transformations of precisely stated propositions into other propositions according to precisely 
stated rules, with freedom in the choice of the rules as well as of the propositions” (Menger 
1974, p.111). 
As regards language, Menger did not share the Kreis’s interest in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
In drafts of Menger 1994, there is a chapter entitled “Atomic proposition, tautologies and 
language”, in which he wrote that “the Tractatus as such was no longer on the agenda; but 
obviously the book was very much on the minds of Schlick and Waismann, somewhat less on 
Hahn’s and Carnap’s, and only Neurath was in opposition”. But, he added, “all members, 
however, had participated in a sentence-by-sentence scrutiny of the Tractatus a year or so 
earlier” and  “a jargon had developed with which I was not familiar”
8 (see also Menger 1982, 
p. 86). Menger did not share the holistic idea of the unity of language, and he voiced his 
opposition to it at some meetings of the Kreis, although only Gödel agreed with his position. 
He wrote: “I objected to the recurring references in the Circle to the language and repeatedly 
asked Carnap, Schlick and other members what justified the implied belief in the uniqueness 
of language. But on this point, too, I failed to receive a satisfactory answer. Schlick did not 
seem to take the question seriously” (Menger 1994 p. 141). Menger remembered how 
frequently Gödel and himself had attended Schlick’s meetings. At the end of one of them, 
during which the formal structure of language had been discussed, Menger said to Gödel: 
“today we have seen how little wittgensteinians are these Wittgenstenians and we kept 
silent”; Gödel’s reply was: “talking about language I am persuaded, I am amazed, of the fact 
that people never understand each other”
9.  
                                                           
8 Karl Menger Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, box 22 (Vienna Circle materials). 
9 Cf. Menger (1994) pag. 210.   11
The distance between Menger and Kreis became manifest when the movement began to 
propagate the idea of  a “Unified Science”. He saw this as “an inroad of a kind of 
metaphysics” that “originated with Waismann” (Menger 1974. p. 110). This ideal of unifying 
the sciences conflicted with “those schools of social science, then flourishing especially in 
Germany, which extolled intuition, cognition of essences, and consciousness of absolute 
values” (Menger 1974, p 111). Like every member of Kreis, Menger rejected “all verbiage 
about essences and the absolute”, but he “was in less than full sympathy with the unity 
movement” (ibid.), which he considered embedded in a monistic scheme entirely useless 
from a methodological point of view. He wrote: “Apart from a general aversion to monistic 
schemes, I feared that for the sake of a methodological monism some at least potentially 
useful procedures might be neglected or even discarded”, and he added: “Nor have I ever 
understood what particularly useful cognitive purpose would be served by such definitory 
unifications and separations even if they were to be achieved” (ibid p. 111- 112).  
Menger’s distance from the Kreis seems extreme; and this was probably the main reason that 
led him to found his Mathematische Kolloquium in  1928. He wrote: “I tried to model the 
Colloquium a little after Schlick’s Philosophical Circle, though in some ways this ideal was 
of course unattainable” (Menger 1982, p 90). 
 
4. Economics in  the Kolloquium: the contribution by Karl Menger 
The  Mathematische Kolloquium was the natural place for Menger’s thought to develop. 
Mathematical inquiries were not its only concern: in 1935 Menger wrote a paper in Italian 
paper in which he explained the Kolloquium’s principal interests. It discussed geometry, 
mathematics and logics, but the social sciences, especially economics and ethics, soon 
became themes of great interest to it. Menger wrote: “in this Kolloquium, beyond studying 
the recent developments of geometry and logics, we are interested in the new applications of 
exact sciences to sociological problems” and in a note he added: “for example on the 
existence and unity of solutions for production equations in mathematical economics, see 
Schlesinger-Wald, Ergebnisse 6, p. 10”, (Menger 1935, p. 327 [my translation]).
10 
While still a student, Menger had been deeply interested in economic issues. In 1923 he 
edited the second edition of his father’s Grundsätze. According to Hayek (1932), this second 
edition “remains in the form of voluminous but fragmentary and disordered manuscripts, 
which only the prolonged and patient efforts of a very skilful editor could make accessible. 
                                                           
10 Economic issues were treated as very important in  Kolloquium from the beginning. I cannot agree with Golland 
(1996), who has maintained that past literature, Punzo’s contributions in particular, “exaggerates the importance of 
economics in Menger’s colloquium (p. 9).   12
For the present, at any rate, the results of the work of Menger’s later years must be regarded 
as lost” (Hayek 1932, p. 416). Frank Knight, editor of the first English translation of 
Grundsätze in 1950, agreed with Hayek.
11. Still today there is no English translation of 
Grundsätze 1923. Karl Menger did not share Hayek’s and Knight’s opinions. In his 
introduction to the second edition of the  Grundsätze, he wrote that, in 1889, his father had 
judged his major work incomplete and said that it should be reformulated in order to combat 
the triumph of historicism in German post-Kantian philosophy.  
In 1923 Karl Menger wrote his first economic paper, “Unsicherheitsmoment in der 
Wertlehere. Betrachungern in Anchluss an das sogenannte Petersburger Spiel”, on the role of 
uncertainty in economics (Menger 1967). Hans Mayer, then the editor? of Zeitschrift für 
Nationalökonomie, refused to publish it because of the excessive use of mathematical 
formulas. The paper was discussed in 1927 at a meeting of the Viennese Economic Society 
and provoked differing reactions. It was only published in 1934, when Oskar Morgenstern - 
according to Menger “one of the very few Austrian economists who were free from 
prejudices against mathematical methods in economics” (Menger 1967, p. 259) - was 
appointed editor of the Zeitschrift.  
Menger addressed the paper to economists and psychologists, inviting them to find a general 
function able to describe the constant behaviour of agents and deviations from it. He started 
with the St. Petersburg paradox. This had been formulated at the end of the eighteenth 
century by Daniel Bernoulli, who was the first to investigate the meaning of the so-called 
“expected utility” for a gambler who persists in playing the same game. Menger was 
concerned with subjective probability and stressed that deviations of behaviour are very 
complex: even in a game with a finite number of solutions, individual choices may disregard  
mathematical expectations.   
In the drafts of his Reminiscences, Menger recalls that only after the mid-1930s were 
mathematical economics considered in Vienna. Carnap was so deeply impressed by 
                                                           
11 Contrary to Hayek, Karl Polanyi considered the second edition of Grundsätze to be fundamental for 
Menger’s thought and the history of economic theory. According to Polanyi, the definition of economics as 
the science of the allocation of scarce means to given ends should to be limited  to only the kind of 
economics based on exchange (Verkehrswirtschaft). Menger was the first economist to realize that 
“economic” had another meaning: in the fourth chapter of Grundsätze 1923, he distinguished two kind of 
economics. The former, called maximizing or economical (okonomisierende),  is founded on the postulate of 
scarcity. The latter, called techno-economical  (sparend,  or  wirtshaftend),  is founded on the physical 
character of production, free from any link with scarcity of means. After the marginalistic revolution, 
economic theory used the principle of scarcity as its only paradigm, achieving such outstanding results that 
the substantivist meaning of economics was abandoned. Knight translated the German word wirtschaften, 
(the substantivist meaning) with the English word economizing, which Menger restricted to the formal 
meaning of “economic”. Polanyi (1971) emphasised that Menger had written the second edition of 
Grundsätze in order to restrict application of the formal meaning of economics only to Western economic 
systems founded on exchange.    13
Menger’s analysis of the St. Petersburg paradox, that, twenty years later, he quoted it in his 
Foundations of Probability. Menger’s article indubitably influenced the subsequent 
reflections of von Neumann and Morgenstern on the axiomatization of utility in games 
theory (Kuhn and Tucker 1958), but, according to Menger, still persisting in both the 
Neumann-Morgenstern’s theory of games and Frank P. Ramsey’s article on probability is the 
idea that the choice with a higher mathematical probability is preferred. By contrast, Menger 
underlined the preponderant weight of uncertainty in economic behaviour.  
In a letter of 18 September 1935, Ragnar Frisch wrote to Menger: “I am very happy to hear 
that you expect in the future to devote part of your  energy to the problems of economics and 
the social sciences. There is a vast need for people, with a genuine mathematical knowledge 
and ability, taking up problems in this field. I am sure that we may expect highly significant 
contributions from you”
12. As we shall see, Menger’s efforts and researches in mathematical 
economics were focused on the axiomatization of economic theory, or better, those aspect of 
economics to which mathematics could be applied according to an meta-mathematical model 
à la Hilbert. His Kolloquium became the place in which the formalization of the GEE model 
came about.  
In 1936 Menger published “Bemerkungen zu den Ertragsgesetzen”, which was translated in 
English in 1954 as “Remarks on the Law of Diminishing Returns. A study in Meta-
Economics”, and according to Schumpeter (1954), “a shining example of the general 
tendency towards increased rigor that is an important characteristic of the economics of our 
own period” (p. 1037). He wrote the paper in answer to Ludwig von Mises’s claim “that 
certain propositions of economics can be proved [and] as an example he mentioned the law 
of diminishing returns and referred me to the literature for the proofs” (Menger 1954, p. 279). 
The meaning of the title is explained by Menger himself: “following a suggestion of Hilbert, 
modern logicians refer to the study of the logical relations between the statements of a theory 
as the corresponding meta-theory. In this terminology, the contents of the present paper can 
be described as a chapter in meta-economics” (ibid. p. 280).  
According to Menger, the proper methodology of economics complies with the following three 
rules:  
“1. By saying that a proposition does not follow  from certain assertions, we do not mean that 
it is not valid …  
2. By saying that a proposition does not follow  from certain others, we do not mean that it is 
valid …  Only experience can show whether or not the derived proposition is valid. 
                                                           
12 Ragnar Frisch to Karl Menger, 18 September  1935, in Karl Menger Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, 
Durham, N.C, box 2 (Correspondence).    14
3. The crucial issue for economics to be whether or not is not  these laws are empirically 
confirmable” (ibid) 
Menger then considered the law of diminishing returns to land first formulated by Eugen 
Böhm-Bawerk: “additional applications of capital and labor on a piece of land increase the 
total product, but after a certain point this output increases relatively less than further costs. 
In other words: like increases of cost produce a decreasing increase of the product” (p. 281) 
[A]. 
 From this law we deduce that: 
a. “an increase of cost outlay yields a smaller increase of the product when added to a larger 
outlay than when added to a smaller outlay (it depends on the amount of land used)”; 
b. “as the cost outlay rises, the average product of every piece of land falls after a certain 
point has been reached  
According to Menger a. and b. are two formulations of the same law (both derived from the 
first one), but – as Menger underlined – “hence far from being equivalent, neither of the two 
laws implies the other” and it can be shown “by elementary algebra”; hence we wonder 
“which of these two propositions do economists mean when they speak of the law of 
diminishing returns”). 
Let us compare these two laws (a. and b.) with the above methodological scheme (1. 2. 3.). 
Neither a. nor b. are logical complements of the other, even though they both derive from 
[A]; the validity of a. does not imply the validity of b., and vice versa. The validity of both 
depends on empirical testability; in particular it depends on additions to large or to small 
outlays: “both laws deal with product increments yielded by additional outlay – but to 
sufficiently small outlays in one case and to sufficiently large outlays in the other” (p. 289). 
Then, two laws can be reformulated thus: 
a. “on every piece of land and for every outlay y1, a fixed additional outlay, h, yields a larger 
product increment when added to y1 than when added to a sufficiently large outlay”; 
b.” on every piece of land, the average product of any given outlay is greater than the average 
product of any sufficiently large outlay” (p. 290). 
Menger verified that a (the law of diminishing product increments) is not a consequence of b 
(the law of diminishing average product), but also that the contrary is valid. And he 
concluded: “From the point of view of methodology, the present paper can perhaps lay claim 
to being the first instance in economics of a clear separation between the question of logical 
interrelations among various propositions and the question of empirical validity” (p. 300).   15
This was, Menger believed, the key point in transforming economics into a science, testifying 
its scientific nature. 
 
5. Economics in the Kolloquium: the reformulation of the GEE model 
The members of the Kolloquium concerned with economics were Abraham Wald and Karl 
Schlesinger. Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann took part, even though the former 
never considered himself a “formal member of either group [Kreis and Kolloquium]” 
(Morgenstern 1976, p. 806) and the latter attended the seminars during his trips from the 
USA to Europe after his appointment as visiting professor at Princeton in 1931.
13 Wald, 
Schlesinger and von Neumann were all engaged in the mathematical reformulation of the 
GEE model. In 1964, Kenneth Arrow wrote to Karl Menger asking him about “the 
intellectual relationship between Wald’s first paper on existence of equilibrium and von 
Neumann’s article on an expanding economy”. He wrote: “[As von Neumann] understands 
the replacement of equations by inequalities along Zeuthen’s lines, whereas clearly the 
problem he raises, that of a uniformly progressive economy, is derived from another section 
of Cassel’s book … did von Neumann arrive at this formulation independently of everyone 
else? Or did he derive it from Schlesinger or Wald? Or is it too late ever to find out?” The 
meaning of Arrow’s questions was that according to him: “the really interesting point is that 
von Neumann’s mathematical methods, introduced in that paper, actually enable one to 
improve greatly on Wald’s proofs, giving both more general and more elegant results”
14. 
Many years later Arrow wrote that Wald and von Neumann “make no reference to each 
other, despite very close apparent links” (Arrow 1989, p. 16). 
The relationship between Wald’s articles and von Neumann’s was undoubtedly close. They 
both tried to solve analytical problems still unresolved in the Walrasian model, which Wald 
and Schlesinger reformulated  according to the one developed by Cassel (1918). Wald dealt 
with the issue in four papers written between 1934 and 1936 (Menger 1952; Koopmans 1964; 
Weintraub 1983). Menger wrote in this regard: “Here [in Wald’s contributions], for the first 
time, economic equations were nor merely formulated. The number of equations was not 
merely compared with the number of unknowns. The equations were solved” (Menger 1952, 
p. 18). For the first time, Wald had solved the mathematical problem of the existence and the 
uniqueness of economically meaningful solutions in an equations system. Wald wrote: “in 
mathematical economics, certain processes .. are described by systems of equations in which 
certain economic magnitudes are used as data and others as unknowns. As a rule, economists 
                                                           
13 According to Punzo (1989), we may consider von Neumann “as a member in pector” of  Kolloquium” (p. 47). 
14 Karl Menger Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, Duhram, N.C., box 2 (Correspondence).   16
have contented themselves with equating the number of equations and unknowns and have 
assumed, without further investigation, that the system of equations had a meaningful 
solution from an economic viewpoint, and that this solution was unique. But the equality of 
the number of equations and un-knows does not prove that a solution exists, much less the 
uniqueness of a solution” (Wald 1935 p. 369-370). Wald used traditional mathematical 
instruments (differential equations and inequalities), bearing in mind the importance in 
economics of investigating the reality of the initial hypothesis.  
Von Neumann’s paper on GEE was presented at a Princeton seminar in 1932 and was then 
discussed by Menger’s Kolloquium in 1937. It finally appeared “as the last paper of the last 
Ergebnisse” (Weintraub 1983, p. 13). It was regarded as “a paper that has greatly influenced 
economic theory up to the present time, and of which all the ramifications have perhaps not 
yet become fully apparent” (Koopmans, 1964, p. 355) and as “the single most important 
article in mathematical economics” (Weintraub, 1983, p. 13). In this paper, von Neumann 
formalized the GEE model with three important differences with respect to Wald’s: he 
described an economic system without the utility function ; he used different mathematical 
tools; and he ignored the problem of realism of hypothesis.  
There were two “properties” of von Neumann’s model (von Neumann, 1945): goods are 
produced by each other, in a sort of circular process, and the number of technical production 
processes may be higher than that of goods (this being the main reason why “counting of 
equations is no avail”). Four solutions were sought by the model: “to establish which 
processes will actually be used and which not”; what is the relative velocity at which the total 
quantity of goods increase; “what prices will obtain”; and finally what the rate of interest will 
be. In order to obtain these four results, von Neumann used the following “idealisations”: 
constant returns; the fact that natural production factors (including labour) could be expanded 
in unlimited quantities; “all income in excess of necessities of life will be reinvested”. These 
idealisations were abstractions and they distanced von Neumann’s GEE model greatly from 
the need to bridge the gap between model and reality that Menger and Wald had deemed so 
urgent.  
The quantities used (a) and the quantities produced (b) of the goods (G) on which production 
processes (P) depend are given, and they must obviously always be non negative. The 
unknowns are four in number and are: the “intensities” (x) of the production process (P)
15; 
the coefficient of expansion of the whole economy (α)
16; the prices (y) of goods; the interest 
                                                           
15 BY “intensities” von Neumann meant the factors that multiply the productiion process P: if x=0, this means that P is 
not used. 
16 Von Neumann wrote: “We are interested in those states where the whole economy expands without change of   17
factor (β). These are connected into four equations (two equations and two inequalities). The 
coefficient of expansion of the whole system (α) depends on the intensity (x) of production 
processes; the rate of interest (β) depends on prices (y). According to von Neumann, “the fact 
that the number of conditions is equal to the number of unknowns does not constitute a 
guarantee that the system can be solved” (von Neumann 1945, p. 3). The possible solution 
furnished by differential equations (as in Wald’s model) was not appropriate in such a 
system: according to von Neumann, “the mathematical proof is possible only by means of a 
generalisation of Brower’s Fix-Point Theorem, i. e. by the use of very fundamental 
topological  facts” (ibid. p. 1). Using convex sets, von Neumann introduced a minimax 
solution as a mathematical instrument with which to prove the verifiability of the GEE 
model. On reaching equilibrium there are two results: “The greatest (purely technically 
possible) factor of expansion α
' of the whole economy is equal to α and to β, neglecting 
prices [(y)]” and “the lowest interest factor β
' at which a profitless system of prices is possible 
is equal to α and to β, neglecting intensities of production [(x)]”. Von Neumann claimed at 
the end of his paper that this solution for the GEE model is proved “only on the basis of our 
knowledge that solutions of our original problem exist – without themselves directly 
referring to this problem”; and he added: “the equality of the maximum in the first form and 
the minimum in the second can be proved only on the basis of the existence of this solution” 
(ibid. p. 9).  This conclusion underlines – like the “idealisations” at the beginning of the 
paper – the distance of the model from reality. They both increased abstraction of the GEE 
theorem of existence to such an extent that the reaction of economists was immediate. 
According to Champernowne (1945): “[von Neumann’s assumption’s] although necessary if 
a rigorous proof of the existence of equilibrium was to be possible, evidently render the 
model unsuitable” for examining real economy; and he added: “the reader may begin to 
wonder in what way the model has interesting relevance to conditions in the real world”, 
(Champernowne 1945, p. 12).  The realism of hypotheses and the correspondence between 
reality and the mathematical model (still present in Wald 1935 and Menger 1936) were 
definitively abandoned in von Neumann’s demonstration of the theorem of the GEE’s 
existence. As we have no reason for doubting that von Neumann’s model was the final 
outcome of the Kolloquium’s mathematical economics, we may say that the result was a 
turning point in the Kolloquium and in the history of economic theory. According to Dore 
(1989), von Neumann’s technique (the introduction of convex mathematical sets and of 
hyperplane “as the theoretical basis for prices – a task essentially completed by Arrow and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
structure, i.e. where the ratios of intensities x1 … xm of the process P1 … Pm remain unchanged, although x1…xm 
themselves may change” (Neumann, 1945, p. 2).   18
Debreu” - p. 93), made it possible to reformulate Walras’s GEE model by replacing Cassell’s 
principles of scarcity with the principle of marginal utility. In this sense, if we accept the idea 
that von Neumann’s model was the last result in economics at the Kolloquium, we can define 
its economic theory as neo-Walrasian (Weintraub, 1983). Nevertheless, this definition 
presumes that the GEE model is an issue that concerneds the Walrasian tradition alone. But 
the problem of finding a GEE model was obviously still present in another tradition, the 
Ricardo-Bortkievicz-Remak-Sraffa’s tradition (from which von Neumann borrowed the 
circular nature of the system). 
 
6. Karl Menger on the relation between mathematical economics  and Austrian school 
It is difficult to talk about economics in Vienna in those years without considering the 
Austrian school. Menger himself wrote a well-known paper in which he argued for continuity 
between mathematical economics and the Austrian school (Menger 1983); but this 
hypothetical continuity is highly problematic.  
The misunderstanding arises from Karl Menger’s memories of those years set out in his 
writings. In Menger 1983,  he recalls that “two souls were in his breast”: he was a 
mathematician, but he was also the son of one of the most important economists in the 
history of economic theory. His particular and personal situation induced him to find a 
possible point of contact between mathematics and economics. According to Karl Menger, 
Austrian and mathematical economists never understood each other properly. They agreed on 
many fundamental economic issues, although they used different forms of expression: the 
Austrians used common language, while the mathematicians used formalization. Menger 
wrote that Irving Fisher (in Mathematical investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices, 
1892) was the first economist to maintain this. The American economist claimed that even 
the laws of physics could be enunciated by two kinds of languages - common and 
mathematical. In order to show that Fisher’s assertion was pertinent to Austrian and 
mathematical economists as well, Menger examined the principle of marginal utility, for 
which the Austrian definition was: “for each good, the utility of a larger quantity is greater 
(or at any rate not less) than that of a smaller quantity, whereas the marginal utility of the 
larger quantity is less (or at any rate not greater) than that of the smaller” (Menger, 1983 p. 
39).  The mathematical formulation is instead: if q denotes the quantity of a good and u its 
utility then:  
u = f(q)   du/dq = f 
′(q) ≥ 0,  a d
2u/d
2q = f″(q) ≤ 0.   19
According to Menger, some mathematical economists believed that these formulas expressed 
more than simple words could, and furthermore that they described the situation more 
precisely.  Menger claimed that this was based on a misunderstanding.: far from saying more, 
these formulas actually say less than the Austrian formulation, because they express the same 
assertion under an additional, but tacit, hypothesis, viz. the assumption that the function 
connecting utility with quantity admits a second derivative, an additional hypothesis that 
clearly is not anchored in economic facts. The Austrian formulation of decreasing marginal 
utility is more general because it is valid even if there are places where the function does not 
admit a second derivative. 
Menger pointed to a further error committed by many mathematical economists: from 
Cournot onwards, they used tacit assumptions, in the theories of return, supply, demand, and 
so on, by assuming the continuity and differentiability of functions as though these properties 
were matters of course, whereas they are nothing but prerequisites for the application of 
classical analysis and are not based on facts. They justified this approach as an advantage 
rather than an obstacle.   This non-verifiability of initial hypothesis was condemned by 
Menger, as we saw when examining his economic papers. Menger suggested that the 
following examples should be considered. If “to a higher price of good, there corresponds a 
lower of it (or at any rate not a higher) demand” and “if p denotes the price of, and q the 
demand for a good” (ibid. p. 41), then: 
Q = f(p) a dq/dp = f 
′(p) ≤ 0  
This formula is not more precise than sentence above: “the only difference between the 
[sentence] and [the formula] is this: since [the formula] is limited to functions that are 
differentiable and whose graphs, therefore, have tangents (which from an economic point of 
view are not more plausible than curvature), the sentence is more general, but it is by no 
means less precise; it is of the same mathematical precision” (ibid.).  
) (p f q =   and   . 0 ) ( ' / ≤ = p f dp dq ” 
It is a misapprehension to regard the formula as more precise than the sentence. The only 
difference between them is this: since the formula is limited to functions that are 
differentiable, the sentence is more general, “but it is by no means less precise; it is of the 
same mathematical precision as the formula”. 
The Austrian concept of Grenznutzen leaves something to be desired in terms of precision, 
but not the Jevonian concept of final degree of utility. Jevons defined it as “the degree of 
utility of the last addition or the next possible addition of a very small, or infinitely small, 
quantity to the existing stock”. “Since by degree of utility Jevons means the ratio of utility to   20
quantity, in modern terms his final degree … is either  ), ( ' / q f dq du =   i.e. the limit of the 
difference quotients  
h
q f h q f ) ( ) ( − +
 
as h gets arbitrarily small, or the quotient itself for the smallest usable increment h”.  This 
relation can be applied to Wieser’s concept of Grenznutzen only if h =1.  Austrians, however, 
“not only steer clear of the concept of calculus …, [but] in keeping with their ordinal 
conception of utility, they even eschew arithmetical operations such as dividing or 
multiplying a utility by a number”. “The problem thus arises whether the Principle of 
Marginal Utility can at all be stated in conformity with those Austrian restrictions. This is 
indeed possible and even in a form that is valid both for Wieser’s marginal utility and for 
Jevons’s final degree” (Menger 1983, p. 42). The utility function must be non-decreasing and 
convex, i.e. it must satisfy the condition  
If  a < b < c,  then  
.
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  Menger notes that, “while this definition of convexity is altogether independent of 
differentiability”, the equation requires a quantitative definition of utility and thus “fails to 
meet one of the Austrian requirements” (ibid,, p.43). He then introduces two “ordinal 
generalizations”: 
First ordinal generalization: “If two quantities of a good are both increased or both decreased 
by the same amount, then the utility of the greater changes less (or at any rate not more) than 
that of the smaller.  In symbols, 
If   , 2 1 x x 〈  then   ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 2 2 x f h x f x f h x f − + ≤ − + .” 
Second ordinal generalization: “For any quantity of good, the increase in utility due to the 
addition of an increment to the quantity is less (or at any rate not greater) than the loss of 
utility due to the subtraction of the same amount. In symbols, 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( h x f x f x f h x f − − ≤ − +  for each x and h (even for h < 0).” 
Thus “one can formulate in the Austrian fashion … general principles without using, or 
referring to, any ideas of calculus” (ibid. p. 44). And so – Menger says in conclusion – even 
the Austrian marginalistic theory of utility can be translated into mathematical terms (see 
also Morgenstern 1931, who was of the same opinion).  
Nevertheless Menger wondered why Austrians never used mathematics. He found an answer 
in the correspondence between Leon Walras and Carl Menger: while for the Lausanne   21
economist, mathematics is the unique means of research, for the Viennese it is only a method 
of description. According to Karl Menger, the Austrians tried to find the causes of economic 
phenomena; while mathematical economists described their functional relations as in Mach’s 
model. According to Menger, the reason for the difference was that the Austrians’ aim was to 
know the essence of economic phenomena, while mathematic economists “pay[ed] less 
attention than the Austrians do – perhaps sometimes not enough attention! – to the definition 
of concepts represented by symbols”  (ibid. p. 52-53).   Menger seems very self-contradictory 
in respect of what he had said previously: he maintained the adherence between Austrian 
economic model and mathematical economics, complaining about only a simple difference in 
language. Nevertheless his conclusions went beyond a simple, even if important, point: 
Menger (wrongly) considered Austrian economic theory to be embedded in a realistic 
epistemological model (based on causes and essences) while mathematicians adopted a 
functionalistic one. This seems to be somewhat naïve: The Austrian economists surely shared 
the second epistemological and methodological model (from Carl Menger’s struggle against 
Schmoller’s historical school until Schumpeter’s theory and Hayek’s studies). 
Conclusions 
The relation between the Kreis and the Kolloquim  was very complex. Otto Neurath 
introduced economics into the Kreis during the 1920s. At the end of the 1920s, the Manifesto 
gave economic theory a specific role in the neoempiricist program: it was a social science 
that could be treated by a new epistemological model, and Carl Menger was regarded as a 
forerunner of this new approach. The International Encyclopaedia incorporated economic 
theory into the project for a unified science. In the early 1930s in Vienna, the rupture 
between the Kreis and the Kolloquium (on mathematics, language and encyclopaedic ideal of 
science) had profound consequences also for economic theory.  
According to Menger, the Kolloquium was the result of three different intellectual influences: 
the Kreis, Hilbert’s formalism, and Austrian economic school. This is true, but only in part. 
The Kreis’s empiricism was undoubtedly fundamental (if we consider it as a reaction to 
German neo-Kantianism, against which both the Kreis and the Kolloquium were hostile). It is 
also true that the Kolloquium mathematicians accepted Hilbert’s paradigm (as did Menger 
and von Neumann - although they were aware of the implications of Gödel’s results on it - 
while Hilbert’s formalism was rejected by the Kreis, and Gödel’s theorem was simply 
ignored in the development of the movement). Finally, the Austrian tradition (in particular 
Carl Menger’s works) was the most important reference in the Kolloquium and was well 
regarded by the Kreis as well.    22
Nevertheless, the Kolloquium broke with the Kreis’s physicalism. During the 1930s a major 
cleavage opened up between the Kolloquium and the Kreis: the former used an axiomatic-
deductive method with a refined formalization also to deal with economics; the latter took an 
empirical experimentalism from physics. The Kreis scientists wanted to apply experimental 
models in economics and their interests were directed to econometric methods; the 
mathematicians of the Kolloquium, headed by Menger, formalized the GEE model.
17. This 
model was not a development, but rather as a renunciation of the Austrian economic model 
and of the Kreis’s project, which centred on the encyclopaedic ideal of a unified science. 
Punzo (1991) has rightly claimed that the relation between mathematics and economics 
during 1930s did not mediate by physics, and that Wald’s and von Neumann’s economic 
model arose from this new experimentalism-free approach. As regards the Austrian school of 
economics, its members seemed to be closer to Kreis’s point of view than the GEE model of 
Schlesinger and Wald, who, not by chance, reformulated Walras’ theory and not Carl 
Menger’s.  
The distance between mathematical economists (Kolloquium) and experimentalist 
economists (Kreis and econometricians) is highlighted by events in Menger’s life that can be 
reconstructed from his correspondence.  For example, in 1935, he declined to contribute to 
Econometrica, whose editor, Ragnar Frisch, wrote to him (in the same letter as quoted in § 
4): “If you come into this field [mathematical economics], may I take this opportunity of 
asking you to give me as editor of Econometrica a chance of seeing your MSS., if you 
complete anything about applications of mathematics to economics”
18. Menger never 
published in Econometrica. He also refused to write “Mathematics” for Neurath’s 
Encyclopedia and attend the congress for the Unity of Science (held in Paris, 1937), as we 
read in a letter of 14 March 1937 where Neurath criticised Menger for refusing to be a 
member of the Advisor Commission for the Encyclopedia.
19 Even many years later, Menger 
declined to join the Institute for the Unity of Science, writing a paper on mathematics for it.
20 
                                                           
17 Nevertheless, considering the formalization of the Walrasian model as the final approach to economics 
mean that we accept the maxim according to which “once understood the rule, then we bow to paradigm”. 
The quotation is from S. Kierkegaard The Diary of Seducer,[ Milano, Rizzoli, 1994, p. 93]. The rule is the 
art of aesthetic loving and the paradigm is Don John, the seducer; here the rule is the formalization of 
Viennese mathematicians and the paradigm is GEE, of course.  
18 Ragnar Frisch to Karl Menger, 18 September 1935, in Karl Menger Papers, Perkins Library, Duke 
University, box 2 (Correspondence). 
19 Otto Neurath to Karl Menger Febraury, 19, 1937 and March, 14, 1937, in Karl Menger Papers, Perkins 
Library, Duke University, box 2 (Correspondence). 
20 In 1952 Philip Frank send him a letter in which he asked him: “perhaps you would be interested in 
writing a small book on the philosophical interpretations of mathematics. The books should be on such a 
level that they are understandable for all people with an average college education and a certain interest in 
science and philosophy. It should be of a length of about 250 pages”. Philipp Frank to Karl Menger, June, 4 
1952, in Karl Menger Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, box 2 (Correspondence).   23
After the mid-1930s the rupture between the Viennese physicians (and social scientists) and 
mathematicians was complete.  
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